In this paper, we show that hedge funds repurchased a large amount of liquid stocks 
Introduction
In the previous decade, the theoretical literature of dynamic portfolio choice with trading costs 1 has developed rapidly. After experiencing the financial crises in 1998 and 2008, more and more scholars started to notice the important role of liquidity management in portfolio choice, especially during times of liquidity crisis. For example, Scholes (2000) suggests that financial institutions should sell liquid assets first for urgent liquidity needs to reduce the transaction costs, and he emphasizes the need to build "a dynamic liquidity cushion" for future liquidity needs. Duffie and Ziegler (2003) investigate numerically the trade-off between selling off an illiquid asset to keep a "cushion of liquid assets", and selling a liquid asset to maximize short-term portfolio value. In accordance with this trade-off, Brown, Carlin, and Lobo (2010) solve a two-period model and show that it is optimal for a myopic investor to sell more liquid assets, but a dynamic investor may sell less liquid assets if they expect a large liquidity shock in the second period. However, there is no direct empirical evidence to this trade-off in the crisis yet.
Among all types of investors, hedge funds might be the group of investors that care most about their liquidity management. It is because clients of hedge funds are mainly sophisticated institutional investors which react quickly to market changes. Moreover, the use of leverage and short positions makes hedge funds more sensitive to fund outflows than other investors.
In this paper, we analyze the quarterly stock holdings of 60 largest hedge funds in U.S. before, during and after the 2008 financial crisis, and document the liquidity composition of their portfolios. We find that consistent with the trade-off between myopic and dynamic liquidity management, hedge funds sold more liquid than illiquid stocks at the peak of the 2008 financial crisis (when there was large amount of redemption), and they repurchased a large amount of liquid stocks and continued to sell illiquid stocks when the crisis mitigated.
For comparison, we do a similar analysis for pension funds. [Insert Figure 1 about here] Second, to investigate whether hedge funds trade liquid and illiquid stocks differently around the crisis, we sort stocks into deciles based on their ILLIQ values, a liquidity measure proposed in Amihud (2002) . We find that hedge funds sold more liquid than illiquid stocks at the peak of the crisis for forced sales, as the selling pressure mitigated, they repurchased a large amount of liquid stocks and continued to sell illiquid stocks in order to build a "liquidity cushion" 2 . In accordance, the portfolio composition of hedge funds shows a delayed "flight to liquidity". The fraction of relatively liquid stocks held by hedge funds decreased slightly at the peak of the crisis (the second half of 2008), from 40% to 38%, and increased substantially to 48% in 2009. Different from hedge funds, pension funds did not trade liquid and illiquid stocks differently around the crisis.
Finally, we do a stock-level regression to control for other effects. For each stock, we regress the change of hedge funds' ownership on stock liquidity, where we control for a set of variables and other stock characteristics, including volatility, size, book-to-market, past 6-month return variables, and previous hedge fund holdings. We do the analysis for the crisis period (2008 Q3 and Q4) and the reversal period (2009 and 2010 Q1) separately.
Hedge funds' myopic and dynamic liquidity management both survive this robustness check and become even more substantial. This paper contributes to at least three threads of literature. financial crisis decreased, the balance of this trade-off shifted from selling more liquid stocks (to reduce trading costs) to selling less liquid stocks (to build "liquidity cushion" for future crisis).
Second, it contributes to the literature documenting institutional investors' dynamic behavior. Because of the availability of data, this thread mainly focuses on mutual funds.
There are only few papers about hedge funds. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) report that hedge fund deleverage substantially at the same period. In this paper, we document hedge funds' dynamic behavior from the perspective of their liquidity management across individual stocks both during and after the crisis period, which provides evidence for both their myopic and dynamic liquidity management.
Third, this paper contributes to the theoretical literature on the limits of arbitrage which emphasizes the role of financial institutions. This thread of literature investigates how costs and financial constraints faced by arbitrageurs can prevent them from eliminating mispricing and providing liquidity to other investors. Simultaneously, financial institutions are the source of many non-fundamental demand shocks (Gromb and Vayanos 2002 , Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009 . In this sense, financial institutions do not necessarily correct anomalies but can also cause them. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) find that because of predictable investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage, hedge funds ride bubbles instead of correcting them. For crisis periods, this paper confirms the finding in Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi (2012) that there are even more fire sales in hedge funds than other investors.
Our paper complements their findings by showing that, to keep a liquidity buffer for future crisis, hedge funds continued to sell their illiquid stocks during the market reversal. It, in theory, would further enlarge the underpricing of illiquid stocks and delay the price reversal. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the data sources and provides the summary statistics for both hedge funds and pension funds. Section 3 analyzes the dynamics of liquid stock holdings v.s. illiquid stock holdings around the crisis for both hedge funds and pension funds. Section 4 offers concluding remarks and possible directions for extensions. Since 1978, all institutions with more than $100 million under discretionary management are required to disclose their holdings in U.S. stocks and a few other securities to the SEC each quarter on form 13F. This concerns all long positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 over which the manager exercises sole or shared investment discretion.
The 13F filings do not contain information on short positions or derivatives, which is a limitation of our analysis. The 13F reporting requirements apply regardless of whether an institution is regulated by the SEC or not, and it also applies to foreign institutions if they "use any means or instrumentality of United States interstate commerce in the course of their business." Hence, it also applies to HFs, provided that their holdings of U.S. stocks exceed the specified thresholds.
In this paper, we investigate the HF managing firms included in "Hedge Fund Top 100" in 2010 from the website "www.institutionalinvestor.com". This rank is based on the size of the assets under management, which serves our research interest. Since large trades have larger price impacts than small trades, large funds are more sensitive to stock liquidity than small funds do. Following the procedure in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) , we discard some managing firms because HF assets only make up a small part of their aggregated institutional portfolio. For each manager, we check whether the firm is registered as an investment adviser with the SEC. Registration is a prerequisite to conduct non-hedge-fund business such as advising mutual funds and pension plans. We search whether it is registered investment adviser. If the firm is not registered, we include it in our sample. If the firm is registered, we obtain registration documents (Form ADV). For a registered firm to be eligible for our sample, we require (1) that at least 50% of its clients are "Other pooled investment vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)" or "High net worth individuals", and (2) Similarly, we only keep the PFs which have complete holding data from 2007 Q1 to 2010 3 Since we only include HF managing firms which have complete holding data from 2007 to 2010, our sample is exposed to survivorship bias. Luckily, the survivorship bias here serves, rather than hurts, our research question. Since the survivors are more likely to be those HFs who managed their liquidity properly during the 2008 crisis. Even if our sample bias toward those HFs who survive for reasons other than liquidity management (such as, stock picking skill, market timing skill or purely luck), it does not affect the main finding of this paper that a significant subset of HFs manage their liquidity dynamically around the 2008 financial crisis. Those alternative stories are not consistent with the fact that they continue to sell the illiquid stocks after the crisis. 4 
Stock Returns and Firm Accounting Data
We use the data of stock returns and accounting information from CRSP and Compustat.
The stock data from different databases are linked by "Ticker" on 2008 June 30. The criteria used to filter the stocks are as below:
(1) We include the stocks that are ordinary common shares (CRSP sharecodes 10 and 11), excluding ADRs, SBIs, certificates, units, REITs, closed-end funds, companies incorporated outside the U.S., and Americus Trust Components. 3636 stocks, from NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq and fulfilling these three criteria, are included into our scope of analysis.
Summary Statistics
Next we summarize equity holdings of HFs and PFs at the aggregate level and the characteristics of stocks held by them. [Insert Table 2 about here] Table 2 shows that the PFs in our sample held about five-sixth of the stocks in the caused by the reversal of the market stock price rather than their trades.
Summary of Stock Characteristics
The definitions and calculations of stock characteristics are listed in Table 3 . Because we want to study the trades of HFs rather than the changes of characteristics for each stock, we do not allow those measures of stock characteristics to change over time 5 . We use the data just before the crisis to construct those measures. Since Lehman's bankruptcy happened in the third quarter of 2008, we use the data on 2008 June 30 (for "Hedge Fund Ownerships", "Market Cap" and "Book-to-Market"), and the daily data in the first half of 2008 (for "Share turnover ", "Bid-Ask Spread ", "ILLIQ", "Past Return" and "Return Variability").
Only the "Market Beta" is calculated using the return data from 2001 January 1 to 2011
June 30.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In Table 4 , we summarize the characteristics of the whole sample of stocks, the stocks held by HFs and the stocks held by PFs separately. The average percentage of shares held by HFs (Hedge Funds Ownership) for the whole samples is 2.7%, and that for the stocks held by HFs is 3.3%, which are obviously larger than 0.5% to 0.8%, the fraction of total market capitalization held by HFs reported in Table 1 . The main reason is that the numbers in Table 4 are calculated as equally weighted, while those in Table 1 reported in the second row, 1.7% for the whole sample and 1.9% for those held by PFs, are also larger than the 0.9% to 1.2% reported in Table 1 . Because PFs put more shares in large stocks than HFs do, the average stock ownership of PFs reported in Table 4 is smaller than that of HFs. The other average stock characteristics of HFs' and PFs' holdings are quite similar.
[Insert Table 4 [Insert Figure 3 Table 5 reports the summary of the stock characteristics for all ILLIQ deciles. The first row shows that HFs' total equity holdings differs a lot across ILLIQ deciles, from $149 billion to $0.2 billion. Consistent with our sorting criteria, the mean of "ILLIQ" increases across ILLIQ deciles, "Bid-Ask Spread" increases across ILLIQ deciles, and "Share Turnover" decreases across ILLIQ deciles. "Market Cap" also decreases from ILLIQ decile 1 to decile 10 since the size and the stock liquidity are highly correlated in cross section.
[Insert Table 5 [Insert Figure 4 about here]
[Insert Table 8 Table 8 reports that HFs reduced a larger proportion of their holdings of liquid stocks (around 30%
for ILLIQ decile 1 to 6) than that of illiquid stocks (around 15% for ILLIQ decile 7 to 10) [Insert Table 7 about here] [Insert Figure 6 about here]
Pension funds' holdings of liquid stocks vs. illiquid stocks
In this section, we do the analysis for PFs' holdings of liquid stocks versus illiquid stocks using the same methodology as for HFs. We find only slight changes of PFs' equity holdings when compared with those of HFs. First, we study PFs' fixed-price equity holdings across ILLIQ deciles. Table 8 [Insert Table 8 
Regression Analysis
Besides trading more liquid stocks, HFs may tend to trade more volatile stocks and apply momentum strategies and value strategies as well around the crisis period. We did not control for those effects in previous section. In this section, we do a stock- returns, "SD" and the past 6-month returns, "past 6-month return", using the half year data just before the period of our analysis. Market capitalization, "size", book-to-market ratios, "book-to-market ratio", and previous HF ownerships, "Previous HF holdings(%)" are based on the data just before the analysis period. We take the natural logarithmic values of ILLIQ, size and book-to-market ratio, and we normalize the mean values of all the stock characteristics to 0 and standard deviations to 1. As the changes of holdings, the "Previous HF holdings(%)" is measured as a percentage of shares outstanding for each stock.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
As shown in Table 9 Column (1), the coefficient of "ln(ILLIQ)" is 0. which were more volatile during the crisis. They bet the stocks which were most volatile during the crisis should reverse more during market upturn. Besides, there is also evidence that HFs purchased more value stocks than growth stocks during the market reversal.
Column (2) and (4) include the size indicator into the explanatory variables. Stock market capitalization "ln(size)" measures both the liquidity and risk of stock, and it is highly negatively correlated with the liquidity measure "ln(ILLIQ)" across individual stocks. The correlation between "ln(size)" and "ln(ILLIQ)" is as large as -0.88. Thus our regressions in
Column (2) and (4) To sum up, the result of regression analysis (where other stock characteristics are controlled) provides even stronger supports to both the myopic and dynamic liquidity management.
Conclusions
Since Constantinides published the groundbreaking paper of dynamic portfolio choice with trading costs in 1986, the theoretical literature in this thread has developed rapidly, (e.g. The analysis of hedge funds' liquidity management in this paper is largely limited by the availability of hedge funds' holding data. Thomson Reuters (13F) database provides only hedge funds' stock holding data. It is on the level of hedge fund managing firms, and quarterly based. It would be interesting to include hedge funds' holdings of other types of assets, such as bonds and cash equivalents, into the analysis, to see whether they shifted from relatively illiquid types of assets to liquid ones during the crisis period, and it is also interesting to do more studies using fund level data or data with higher frequency. Table 8 ). . The "Number of stocks held" in the third column refers to the total number of stocks held by those HF managing firms in each quarter, out of 3636 stocks within the scope of our analysis. The "Fraction of total MC (%)" is the total dollar amount of the shares held by those HF managing firms as a fraction of the entire equity market measured by "Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index". "$ amount (bill$)" is the total dollar amount of equities held by those HF managing firms. (2002), is calculated as the ratio of the absolute value of daily return to daily dollar trading volume. We obtain ownership data from Thomson Reuters, stock information from CRSP and accounting information from COMPUSTAT. "HFs' total holding (bill$)" reports hedge funds' total equity holdings at the end of 2008 Q2. The descriptions of stock and firm characteristics are in Table 3 . This table presents descriptive statistics of stock and firm characteristics by ILLIQ dollar-quintiles. We sort all stocks in our sample (3636 stocks) into ILLIQ dollar-quintiles, making hedge funds' equity holdings in each ILLIQ dollar-quintile the same at the end of 2008 Q2. ILLIQ dollar-quintile 1 is for most liquid stocks and ILLIQ dollar-quintile 5 for most illiquid ones. We obtain ownership data from Thomson Reuters, stock information from CRSP and accounting information from COMPUSTAT. "HFs' total holding (bill$)" reports hedge funds' total equity holdings at the end of 2008 q2. The descriptions of stock and firm characteristics are in Table 3 . The explanatory variables include a set of stock characteristics and previous HF ownership. We calculate the ln value of stock ILLIQ ratio, "ln(ILLIQ)", the standard deviation of daily return, "SD" and the past 6-month returns, "past 6-month return", using the half year data just before the analysis period. The ln value of market capitalization, "ln(size)", the ln value of book-to-market ratio, "ln(book-tomarket ratio)" and previous HF ownerships, "Previous HF holdings(%)" are based on the data just before the analysis period. We normalize the mean values of all the stock characteristics to 0 and standard deviations to 1. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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